

# Online Research @ Cardiff

This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional repository: <https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/114162/>

This is the author's version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.

Citation for final published version:

Dafydd, Einion ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7971-664X> and Badanjak, Sanja 2020. Electoral accountability, responsibility attribution, and the democratic deficit in devolved Wales. Parliamentary Affairs 73 (1) , pp. 22-45. 10.1093/pa/gsy031 file

Publishers page: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy031>  
<<http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy031>>

Please note:

Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite this paper.

This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies.

See

<http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html> for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.



# **Electoral Accountability, Responsibility Attribution, and the Democratic Deficit in Devolved Wales**

**Einion Dafydd and Sanja Badanjak**

This study explores electoral accountability at the devolved level in Wales. The retrospective voting model assumes that electoral accountability requires that citizens assign responsibility accurately and vote on the basis of their evaluation of government performance. Drawing on data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study, we examine whether citizens in Wales can identify devolved policy competences and office holders, and identify factors that are linked to accurate attributions. We then examine whether voters seek to use devolved elections as a sanctioning tool, even if they do not have the information required to do so accurately. The findings indicate that there is an acute accountability deficit at the devolved level in Wales: few have the knowledge or the inclination to hold those in power to account. The conclusion discusses the implications of these findings for democracy in Wales and in other multi-level settings.

**Keywords: electoral accountability, democratic deficit, responsibility attributions, devolution, Wales**

According to the retrospective voting model, a key function of elections is to provide citizens with an opportunity to hold those in power responsible for their performance (Fiorina, 1981). Citizens may re-elect incumbents who have performed strongly and dismiss office holders who have performed poorly. Yet citizens are not always able to use elections to sanction in this way (Anderson, 2006; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). For elections to work as an effective

sanctioning tool, citizens must be able to attribute responsibility for policy performance accurately and those attributions must inform voting behaviour (Arceneaux, 2006). In many settings, fulfilling these requirements asks a great deal of citizens. They must be able to identify which governmental institutions are responsible for specific policy areas and which party(s) holds power within those institutions; citizens must also be informed sufficiently to be able to evaluate policy performance at least at a rudimentary level and they must vote on the basis of these evaluations (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Garry, 2014). Citizens are unable to use elections to hold those in power responsible for their record if they fail to identify who deserves the credit or blame for policy outcomes and/or fail to take government performance into account when voting (Cutler, 2017). It is well established that citizens in many settings cannot attribute responsibility accurately (e.g. Cutler, 2004; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014) and/or fail to draw on their attributions when voting (e.g. Arceneaux, 2006; Johns, 2011).

Issues relating to responsibility attributions warrant particular attention in the context of the devolved level in Wales. The Welsh public was promised that devolution would revitalize democracy in Wales by bringing government ‘closer to the people’ (HC Deb 22 July 1997, c757). The composition of government would be closely aligned with public preferences in Wales; accountability would be stronger since citizens would more easily be able to hold those in power responsible for government performance (Chaney et al., 2001). Two decades following the 1997 referendum on devolution, the state of electoral accountability in Wales has not been subjected to detailed scholarly attention and so it remains unclear whether these promises have been realised. Politicians (BBCNews, 2012) and scholars (Cushion and Scully, 2016) have long voiced concerns regarding the strength of electoral accountability in devolved Wales. Concern centres on the issue of whether voters possess sufficient knowledge

to make effective use of their vote at devolved elections. Given the paucity of empirical evidence on public understanding of devolution, an examination of whether citizens in Wales can use their vote to hold the increasingly powerful devolved office holders to account is long overdue.

This article investigates the strength of accountability at devolved elections in Wales. We start, in Section 1, by reviewing the literature on responsibility attributions and by discussing the factors that make the task of attributing responsibility challenging for citizens. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the key themes in the development of Welsh devolution that may affect the accuracy of attributions, and discuss the relevance of Wales as a case study. Section 3 outlines the study's aims and presents the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES), the data source explored in subsequent sections. Three empirical sections follow, each examining a distinct issue relating to responsibility attribution and voting behaviour. In Section 4 we examine the extent to which Welsh voters attribute responsibility accurately: in terms of identifying at which level of government responsibility for key policy areas lies (cf. Arceneaux, 2006) and in terms of identifying the partisan composition of government (cf. Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). This is basic knowledge that citizens must possess to sanction or reward office holders. In Section 5 we investigate whether some groups face particular difficulties in attributing responsibility. We do this by presenting multivariate models which identify factors linked to (in)accurate responsibility attributions (cf. Johns, 2011). Section 6 explores whether citizens in Wales draw on their attributions when voting (cf. Arceneaux, 2006), regardless of whether they assign responsibility accurately. This tells us whether citizens seek to use their vote to reward or sanction office holders, even if they lack the required knowledge. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings, for Wales and more broadly.

This study contributes to the emerging literature on Welsh devolution. It identifies whether devolution has delivered on the promise of strong electoral accountability and tests the prevalent claim that electoral accountability in Wales is weak. Further, the examination of whether some groups face particular difficulties in attributing responsibility informs debates on how to improve public understanding of devolution. Given the peculiarities of the Welsh case study (see Section 2), the article provides a basis for making a contribution to understanding of responsibility attribution more broadly. We present evidence on how citizens respond to the challenge of attributing responsibility in a setting where constitutional change is frequent and the consumption of indigenous news media is limited.

## **1. A Review of the Literature on Responsibility Attributions and Electoral Accountability**

How citizens attribute responsibility for policy outcomes plays a crucial role in determining whether elections serve as an effective sanctioning mechanism.<sup>1</sup> According to the retrospective voting model, citizens use elections to reward or sanction those in power for their performance in office (Fiorina, 1981); electoral accountability is strongest when there is a close link between performance evaluations and vote choice. A key assumption underpinning the retrospective voting model is that citizens attribute responsibility for outcomes to the appropriate political actor(s) and draw on these attributions when voting (Cutler, 2004; Arceneaux, 2006; Rudolph, 2006). Citizens must evaluate policy outcomes and sanction or reward those – and only those – who are responsible for the outcomes in question (Anderson, 2006, p. 450). In other words, to hold their elected office holders to account for

---

<sup>1</sup> There is a vast literature on forms of accountability other than electoral accountability. For a discussion on how changes in decision making patterns and multi-level governance have given rise to new forms and understandings of accountability see e.g. Papadopoulos (2007).

their past performance citizens must engage in ‘attribution-sensitive retrospective performance based voting’ (Garry, 2014, p. 87). Citizens who misattribute responsibility are liable to reward or sanction the ‘wrong’ office holder; voters who fail to draw on their attributions when deciding how to vote do not engage in retrospective voting. With these considerations in mind, scholars have examined whether and under what conditions citizens attribute responsibility accurately and draw on these attributions when voting. Institutional and individual-level factors have been identified as making the task of attributing responsibility more challenging for citizens, as discussed below.

The complexity of the institutional environment has been identified as a major factor undermining citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility. In systems of multi-level governance, responsibility is dispersed ‘vertically’ between institutions operating at different levels<sup>2</sup>, and citizens must identify at which level different functions are carried out. In addition to the increased information costs that citizens face, governments at different levels have an incentive to mislead citizens by shifting blame and taking credit (Anderson, 2006, p. 449). The difficulties for citizens are most acute in settings where power is shared between levels, along the lines of the marble cake model rather than the layer cake model of federalism (León, 2012; Cutler, 2017).<sup>3</sup> Studies of multi-level settings demonstrate that citizens struggle to judge accurately which level of governance is responsible for various functions (Cutler, 2004; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Even in settings where voters can

---

<sup>2</sup> The literature differentiates between the ‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’ dispersion of responsibility. The ‘vertical’ dispersion of responsibility refers to the dispersion of power between different levels of governance. The ‘horizontal’ dispersion of responsibility refers to the dispersion of power between actors on the same level of governance.

<sup>3</sup> In settings where the ‘layer cake’ model applies, responsibility over specific policy areas lies exclusively at specific levels and therefore it is clear which level has responsibility for a given policy area. In settings where ‘the marble cake’ model applies, it is more difficult to identify which level is primarily responsible for a given policy area because responsibility is shared between different levels.

attribute responsibility accurately, there is limited (Cutler, 2017), or no (Johns, 2011), evidence that citizens draw on these attributions when deciding how to vote. Retrospective voting is weaker in multi-level settings than in unitary systems (Anderson, 2006). The promise of decentralisation – that citizens find it easier to hold those in power to account – goes unfulfilled in many settings; politicians in multi-level settings appear to be ‘less, not more, accountable for their actions’ (Arceneaux, 2006: 731).

Considerations relating to the ‘horizontal’ division of power can also complicate the task of attributing responsibility. Factors such as the lack of voting unity within governmental parties, the presence of a bicameral opposition and a strong committee system have the effect of dispersing power and reducing governmental clarity (Powell and Whitten 1993). Network governance, the increasingly common practice whereby social actors play a crucial role in the design and implementation of services, has a similar effect (Papadopoulos, 2007). In multi-party systems, power is often shared horizontally between parties forming a coalition government. In such settings, citizens must identify which of the governing parties bears principal responsibility for performance in specific areas (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010). Many citizens fail at these tasks (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). Citizens under multi-party governments find it more difficult to hold those in power to account: retrospective voting is less prevalent under coalition governments than in two-party systems (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010).

Individual-level factors can also affect voters’ ability to make accurate attributions. Bias can lead citizens to misattribute responsibility. It can also lead citizens to identify one political actor as being responsible for governmental performance in a given area (functional responsibility) yet to credit or blame another actor for those outcomes (causal responsibility)

(Arceneaux, 2006). Predispositions, most notably partisanship, can act as a 'perceptual screen' which conditions how citizens evaluate outcomes and assign responsibility for those outcomes. Party supporters tend to credit their party for policy successes while shifting blame away for policy failures (Rudolph 2006; Marsh and Tilley, 2010). Constitutional preference is another factor that can lead voters to engage in motivated responsibility attribution. Hobolt and Tilley find that 'EU supporters are more likely to claim responsibility for the EU when things are going well and less likely to say that the EU is responsible when things are going badly' (2014, p. 6). It is clear that several sources of bias impedes voters' efforts to assign responsibility and blame.

Political knowledge is another individual-level factor which shapes whether voters can attribute responsibility accurately, and in turn, whether they can use their vote in an informed manner. Citizens require information about the institutional environment and about policy outcomes if they are to attribute responsibility accurately and draw on these attributions when voting (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014: p. 18). Those with limited political knowledge tend to draw on cues when making political decisions. While these can sometimes be successfully used (Sniderman et al., 1991), they often mislead citizens (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Those with limited political knowledge are therefore in a weaker position to make effective use of their vote.

Media consumption can assist citizens to attribute responsibility, but it can also be a hindrance. While media reports can provide valuable information, they can also be inaccurate or misleading, or they can prompt individuals to draw on their biases (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, ch. 5; Maestas et al., 2008). Empirical findings relating to the effect of media consumption on responsibility attributions are mixed. Reading newspapers leads Scottish



voters to misattribute devolved responsibilities to the UK level (Johns, 2011, p. 66). Media consumption has no general effect on the accuracy of responsibility judgments relating to the EU (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, chs. 5–6). Cutler (2017) finds that judgments are more accurate when the media clearly attributes responsibility for the issue in question to a particular level. The key, according to Cutler, is that ‘the media are structured to provide separate reporting of each government’s actions’ (Cutler, 2017, p. 18).

This section has drawn on the increasingly voluminous literature on responsibility attributions to show that citizens often find it difficult to identify which political actor is responsible for governmental outcomes. Institutional complexity, bias, and limited access to reliable information hinder citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility and consequently limit the public’s ability to hold those in power to account. The discussion highlights the importance of examining responsibility attributions in settings where electoral accountability plays a key role in underpinning the legitimacy of the political system. The following section explains why it is particularly important to examine these issue in the context of Welsh devolution, and how evidence relating to Wales can help broaden understanding of the challenges faced by citizens when attributing responsibility.

## **2. Devolved Wales as a case study**

The architects of devolution promised that it would reinvigorate democracy in Wales. The creation of an elected institution would give rise to a ‘new politics’ based on inclusiveness and consensual decision-making, and lead to better governance (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001; McAllister, 2000; McAllister and Cole 2007, 2014; Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001). Principles such as ‘accessibility, representativeness, legitimacy, openness, participation, innovation, inclusiveness and accountability’ would lie at the heart of devolved politics, and

these values would be used as criteria for evaluating its performance (Chaney et al., 2001: 3). Several studies have examined the degree to which some of these aspirations have been met.

The literature identifies some important successes. Since the introduction of devolved elections, the partisan composition of the devolved government has more accurately reflected the popular will in Wales (e.g. Scully and Lerner, 2017). The use of fairly open candidate selection systems (Bradbury et al., 2000; Stirbu et al., 2018), and of the semi-proportional AMS electoral system, has led to the election of a chamber that has a far better gender balance than seen elsewhere in the UK (McAllister and Cole, 2007; 2014). Efforts to ‘widen participation in the governmental process’ have also been a success, with civil society groups ‘far more intimately involved in the policy-making processes than is usually the case at the UK level’ (Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001: 24–5; however see Chaney 2016).

Performance on other measures has been weaker. There are few signs of any fundamental ‘change in political culture’ (McAllister, 2000: 603; McAllister and Kay, 2010). The realities of electoral competition have prevented the development of a more consensual political culture, with the government–opposition dynamic evident in the Assembly from the outset (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001; McAllister, 2000). Hopes that devolution would lead to distinctive policies for Wales have largely gone unrealised, as only some evidence of policy innovation has emerged (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 257; Williams, 2011). While the semi-proportional electoral system is an improvement on first-past-the-post, disproportionality is high (McAllister and Cole, 2007, 2014). Turnout is low, disappointing hopes of broad public participation in devolved politics (Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001). Further, Scully and Wyn Jones (2015) demonstrate that while support for Welsh devolution has increased, the public legitimacy of the devolved institutions in Wales remains uncertain.

While the literature on Welsh devolution has made important strides forward, little is known about whether one of the key promises of devolution – strong electoral accountability – has been fulfilled. Examining the strength of electoral accountability is important in any democratic setting, and particularly so in Wales. The claim that an accountability deficit exists in Wales is prevalent and made by high profile politicians (BBC News, 2012) and scholars (Cushion and Scully, 2016). Few people in Wales consume news created in Wales (Thomas et al., 2004; Cushion and Scully, 2016), and coverage of devolved politics in Wales by the London-based news media (widely consumed in Wales) is limited (McAllister and Cole, 2014: 182). The result, it is argued, is that public understanding of devolution is too limited for voters to be able to hold those in power to account.<sup>4</sup>

While this claim is plausible given the particular attribution challenges which apply in Wales (discussed below), the evidential basis for making such a claim is currently problematic in two ways. First, it is primarily based on inferences made relating to patterns of media consumption in Wales, rather than on direct measures of public understanding of devolution. Second, the issue of whether citizens draw on their knowledge of devolution when voting has not been examined. Our study innovates by addressing both issues. We draw on data relating to responsibility attributions to examine whether citizens can make informed use of their vote; we also examine whether attributions shape voting behaviour. This approach provides a stronger empirical basis for making claims relating to the strength of accountability specifically in Wales. It also enables us to develop understanding of the link between media consumption and responsibility attributions more generally.

---

<sup>4</sup> The literature also raises concerns about the strength of accountability within the Assembly. The ability of the Assembly's committees to provide effective scrutiny is limited due to the chamber's small size and the heavy workload of AMs (UK's Changing Union, undated; The Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform, 2017).

Three considerations may present particular attribution challenges to Welsh voters: ‘the chronic lack of clarity in the division of powers’ between the devolved and the UK levels (Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001: 25) which has persisted despite continual reform of the Welsh constitution (Wyn Jones, 2016); the novel institutional design whereby there was initially no separation of powers between the executive and the legislature (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 270–1); and the frequent changes made to devolved constitutional arrangements (e.g. McAllister and Cole, 2007; 2014).

When established in 1999, the Assembly was given the powers previously exercised by the Secretary of State for Wales. These included control over the expenditure of the Welsh block grant and the ability to pass secondary legislation within the framework of primary legislation passed by the UK Parliament (Taylor et al., 1999: xxx). The Assembly was not given ‘even theoretical fiscal autonomy’ (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 270). While it had ‘responsibility for the day-to-day running of services like health and education’, its lack of primary legislative powers meant that ‘it would not have the ability to change the major structure or objectives of those services’ (Taylor et al., 1999: xxxi). The Assembly was reliant on the UK Parliament in two key ways: for determining the size of its budget and to pass primary legislation on its behalf. Scholars roundly criticised these arrangements, Wyn Jones and Trystan describing the settlement as ‘a system of Byzantine complexity’ (2001: 46; see also McAllister 2000: 603; Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 247). The ‘vertical’ division of responsibility between the devolved and the UK level has been unclear from the outset.

These problems were compounded by the unclear ‘horizontal’ division of powers at the devolved level. The National Assembly for Wales was initially established as a corporate

body, with no legal separation of power between a legislative and an executive body, and with the institution as a whole being formally responsible for all decisions. A *de facto* shift occurred in the early years of the Assembly, and the Government of Wales (2006) Act formalized the separation of powers between the legislature (the National Assembly for Wales) and the executive (the Welsh Government). Ambiguities relating to the horizontal division of powers between devolved institutions may have hindered efforts to attribute responsibility at the crucial time when citizens were first learning about devolution.

Devolved powers have been modified several times since 1999. Lines of responsibility remained blurred under the second model of devolution created by the Government of Wales (2006) Act. Under the new Legislative Competence Order (LCO) procedure, the Assembly could ask the UK Parliament for the right to make primary legislation on predefined issues (McAllister and Cole, 2007: 537). Primary legislative powers were now being transferred from London to Cardiff gradually and on an ad hoc basis, presenting new attribution challenges for citizens. Lines of responsibility became clearer in 2011, when powers to make primary legislation in devolved areas were granted to Wales following a referendum (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012). Two further Wales Acts in 2014 and 2017 revised constitutional arrangements further. The 2014 Act devolved limited taxation powers to Wales for the first time; the 2017 Act modified how powers are devolved to Wales, prompting a change from the conferred powers model to the reserved powers model of devolution. Despite the strengthening of devolved powers, the arrangements still resemble a ‘marble cake’ model of federalism more than the ‘layer cake’ model that citizens find easier to understand. Further, it is unclear whether citizens have been able to keep track of these constitutional changes.

### **3. Aims, contribution, and data**

With these considerations in mind, this study examines three issues: whether citizens in Wales are able to attribute responsibility accurately, which factors are linked to their (in)ability to do so, and whether citizens draw on their attributions when voting. The study makes three primary contributions. First, we provide the first systematic evaluation of whether Welsh devolution has delivered on the promise of strong electoral accountability. In so doing, we test the prevalent claim that devolved Wales suffers from an accountability deficit and provide a more rigorous empirical basis for debates on this issue. Second, we identify whether understanding of devolution is particularly limited within certain social groups. This provides an indication of whether efforts at educating the public should focus on specific sections of society. Third, the study makes a broader contribution to the literature on responsibility attributions. Our findings inform understanding of how citizens deal with the attribution challenges presented in settings where constitutional change is frequent and the consumption of indigenous media low.

The analysis that follows draws on data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES).<sup>5</sup> This is the most comprehensive survey of the Welsh electorate ever undertaken and is the latest in a series of major surveys conducted to coincide with devolved elections in Wales. This series has provided the basis for the bulk of research on electoral behaviour in Wales, including the standard work on voting behaviour at the 2016 Welsh election (Scully and Lerner, 2017). WES is a three-wave panel survey conducted online by YouGov around the time of the devolved election, held on 5 May 2016. The pre-election wave was conducted 7–18 March, the election wave was conducted 5 April–4 May, and the post-election wave was conducted 6–22 May. A total of 2,115 responded to all three waves, while 3,272 individuals responded to the first and largest wave. The questionnaires included survey items specifically relating to

---

<sup>5</sup> Standard survey weights have been applied in the analysis to ensure that the sample used is representative of the adult population in Wales.

responsibility attributions. These were worded to mirror questions successfully administered in other settings and which form the basis of major studies dealing with similar issues (e.g. Johns, 2011; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Consequently, unlike previous work (Cushion and Scully, 2016), we need not rely on inferences relating to media consumption and can directly examine the three issues that are of interest: the accuracy of attributions, the factors linked to variance in the accuracy of attributions, and whether voters draw on their attributions when voting. In short, the survey provides an unusually rich data source for examining the state of electoral accountability in Wales.

#### **4. The accuracy of responsibility attributions in devolved Wales**

To what extent are people in Wales able to attribute political responsibility accurately? We investigate this issue by examining whether citizens can identify two issues: which level of government has responsibility for key policy areas, and the partisan composition of the Welsh Government in the period leading up to the 2016 election. This section draws on the second wave of WES, conducted during the election campaign.

Before presenting the findings, it is worth noting that more than half of respondents (61.8%) agreed with the statement that ‘it is often difficult to figure out which level of government is responsible for what’. More than a third (36.9%) stated that the election campaign had provided them with insufficient information ‘to make an informed choice’. This provides initial grounds for concern, given that this survey wave was conducted in the days leading up to the election.

At the aggregate level, respondents correctly attributed responsibility for major policy areas. Table 1 shows that the majority of respondents identified that responsibility for the two key

devolved policy areas, health (64.4%) and education (58.6%), lies with the Welsh Government, and that responsibility for foreign policy (77.5%) and taxation (78.1%) lies at the UK level. There is much confusion regarding whether responsibility for law and order has been devolved, although a plurality (47.5%) correctly ascribed responsibility for this to the UK level. Despite the fairly positive general trend, a considerable proportion of the Welsh electorate did not identify that health and education are devolved competences. This is despite the fact that the Welsh Government spends almost half of its entire budget on health and that education is its third largest budgetary item (Welsh Government, 2017).

[Table 1]

To ascertain whether citizens could identify the partisan composition of the Welsh Government, respondents were asked ‘As far as you are aware, which party or parties have had ministers in the Welsh Government between 2011 and now?’ Respondents could select as many parties as they wished, and had 30 seconds to answer as is customary with survey questions which test knowledge. The ‘don’t know’ option was available.

Table 2 shows that only around 1 in 6 (16.0%) could identify that Labour governed alone in the period leading up to the 2016 election. More than a third of respondents (39.4%) were apparently unaware that Labour – the long-time dominant party in Wales – was in government at all. While more than half of respondents (60.8%) identified Labour as a party of government in Wales, it appears that many citizens were confused about the partisan composition of the Welsh Government and/or were under the impression that it comprised of multiple parties: 69.5% believed that a coalition government was in power at the devolved level in Wales at a time of single party government.



[Table 2]

The findings obtained so far present a bleak picture. While many citizens in Wales were able to identify that responsibilities for key policy areas are devolved, a large minority could not. Even more alarming is the finding that the overwhelming majority of citizens in Wales could not identify the partisan composition of the single-party government. The findings suggest that a vast proportion of citizens in Wales do not have the knowledge required to hold those in power at the devolved level to account.

## **5. Explaining variation in the accuracy of responsibility attributions**

The findings presented above indicate that there is at least some, and potentially considerable, variation in citizens' understanding of devolution. The next task is to identify which factors are linked with citizens' (in)ability to attribute responsibility correctly. This helps us to understand whether certain groups are in a stronger position than others to use elections as an accountability mechanism, and whether initiatives aimed at improving public knowledge of devolution should therefore target specific groups.

We report findings from two multivariate models that explore the predictors of knowledge of devolved politics (Table 3). Model 1 examines knowledge of devolved competences. The dependent variable is based on an additive score, with each respondent awarded a point for each correct answer to the question 'which level of government is mainly responsible for the following policy areas?': health, education, law and order, foreign policy, and taxation. The minimum score is zero and the maximum is five. Since this dependent variable counts the number of correct answers given by respondents, we estimate a Poisson regression, which is

appropriate for this type of data. Model 2 examines knowledge of the partisan composition of the Welsh Government. The binary dependent variable indicates whether the respondent could identify that Labour governed alone and prompts the use of logistic regression as the estimation technique.<sup>6</sup>

The specifications of the two regression models are identical. We include three sets of independent variables. The first set presents the standard socio-demographic variables: age<sup>7</sup>, whether there are children present in the household, education level, gender, housing status, marital status, and social class. This provides a means of testing whether older, wealthier, married, better-educated, and male citizens are more knowledgeable about politics in Wales as they are found to be in other settings.

The second set of independent variables relates to the experience of living in Wales and to issues of culture and identity. We include variables relating to the respondent's place of birth, Welsh language ability, and national identity, as is customary when exploring issues relating to public attitudes and participation in Wales (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012). In light of findings that constitutional preferences are linked to attitudes and evaluations (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Johns, 2011), we also control for respondents' constitutional preferences.

The third set of predictors focus on political interest, engagement and outlook. The dummy variable 'Welsh media consumption' indicates whether the respondent consumes any TV,

---

<sup>6</sup> For summary statistics and replication materials see Supplementary Material.

<sup>7</sup> We include both a squared and a cubed term for respondent age to account for potential differences across age groups and the likely non-linear relationship between age and political knowledge.

radio, or print news media created in Wales.<sup>8</sup> This provides a means of examining whether knowledge levels are higher among those who consume at least some news from Welsh sources. We also include a self-reported measure of political interest, a self-reported measure of respondents' likelihood to vote, a series of party identification dummy variables, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was contacted by any party during the election campaign.

[Table 3]

The key finding is that, contrary to expectations, few factors are linked with higher knowledge levels. There is no indication that certain socio-demographic factors, including age, class, or housing status affect the accuracy of attributions. The attributions of women who do not live in a household with children are just as accurate as those of men. Knowledge levels are lower among those who are married or have a partner, and those who have no experience of higher education.

It is particularly striking that there is no clear link between knowledge of devolution and several factors relating to experiences of Welsh life. Those who speak at least some Welsh are no more knowledgeable than non-Welsh speakers. We identify no link between respondents' preferred constitutional status and their ability to assign responsibility correctly, in contrast to findings in other multi-level contexts (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Johns, 2011). Those who have a stronger Welsh identity are more likely to identify that Labour governed alone than British identifiers. However, in terms of their ability to identify devolved competences, there are no differences between Welsh and British identifiers or between those

---

<sup>8</sup> This does not take any consumption of online news media generated in Wales into account, since the survey data does not enable us to create a reliable measure in relation to this issue.

born in Wales and those who have moved to Wales later in life. Surprisingly, those who were born outside Wales are more likely to be able to identify that Labour governed alone than respondents born in Wales. This may be because differences between Wales and the rest of the UK may be more starkly noticeable for those who have lived in Wales and elsewhere in the UK.

It is highly noteworthy that consumption of any news media generated in Wales has no effect on the accuracy of attributions, in contrast to findings obtained in other settings (Cutler, 2017; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). This presents a challenge to the claim that the low consumption of indigenous Welsh news media is the main cause of the limited awareness of devolved governance in Wales. This finding also provides grounds for questioning the assumption that knowledge levels would increase if more people consumed Welsh news.

The findings suggest that electoral campaigning can increase levels of public knowledge of devolution. Respondents who were contacted by any party during the campaign period are more likely to correctly identify the composition of government. However, there is no evidence that campaign contact is linked to increased awareness of the division of competences. With regard to party affiliation, there is little evidence that understanding is higher among party identifiers, although knowledge of the division of powers is higher among Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters.

Unsurprisingly, knowledge is higher among those with a greater interest in politics and those who are more likely to vote in devolved elections. It is significant that those who know less about devolved politics are less likely to vote: not only does the finding contrast with the situation in Northern Ireland (Garry, 2014), but it also suggests that those who do not

understand devolution do not engage with elections, a key feature of Wales' so-called 'participatory' new democracy (Chaney et al., 2001).

What the multivariate analysis makes clear is that few groups within the population are distinctly less knowledgeable than others. If the solution to the problem identified in the previous section – limited knowledge – is to take steps to improve public understanding of devolution, these findings provide no clear guide as to where such efforts should be targeted. Knowledge levels are lowest among those who are least interested in politics; this suggests that it is those who need reaching the most are also those who are the most difficult to reach. A further point of concern is the finding that those who are less politically engaged are not only less likely to vote, but also less likely to be able to use their vote well. Finally, the findings suggest that increased consumption of news media created in Wales may not lead to increased public understanding of devolution, as many assume (BBC News, 2012; Cushion and Scully, 2016).

## **6. The effect of responsibility attributions on electoral behaviour in Wales**

So far we have examined one specific aspect of the health of electoral accountability in Wales: whether citizens possess sufficient information to hold those in power to account. In this section we examine a separate aspect: whether voters in Wales use their vote to punish or reward those they believe are in power, even if they are operating on the basis of inaccurate information. In other words, we examine whether responsibility attributions have a moderating effect on vote choice. If retrospective voting operates in Wales, the problem is solely one of knowledge, and the remedy must focus on increasing public awareness of devolution. However, if performance evaluations do not shape electoral behaviour, then

devolved elections in Wales are undermined by a dual problem: that citizens have neither the information nor the inclination to use their vote to hold those in power to account.

We examine this issue in two ways. First, we consider whether voters engage in retrospective voting by rewarding or punishing those they believe are in government on the basis of performance evaluations. This provides a means of testing whether voters still attempt to vote retrospectively, even if they reward or sanction the incorrect party (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). Second, we examine whether the most knowledgeable voters – those who could identify that Labour governed alone – vote retrospectively. We investigate these issues by constructing two binary logistic regression models, presented in Table 4.

Model 1 takes a dependent variable that identifies whether the respondent voted for one of the parties that they thought had been in government in Wales during the previous term.<sup>9</sup> The model is specified in the same way as the models presented in Section 4, apart from the addition of two independent variables which account for respondents' performance evaluation of health and education. Respondents were asked if they thought the standard of healthcare in the NHS and the standard of education had fallen, with higher scores indicating that the respondent thought that the standard had fallen. These two policy areas have been selected because they are highly salient devolved policy areas: of the policy areas where responsibility lies primarily at the devolved level, health and education are the two that Welsh citizens stated as being the 'most important ... in the upcoming Welsh Assembly election' (Scully, 2016). It is therefore reasonable to assume that it is on their evaluations of government performance in these policy areas that Welsh voters draw when voting at devolved elections, if voters draw on evaluations relating to any devolved policy areas.

---

<sup>9</sup> We draw on data from the post-election wave in this section. Non-voters are excluded from the analysis.

Our sole interest lies in the results relating to the health and education variables: a positive and statistically significant effect would indicate that citizens draw on performance evaluations when deciding how to vote. In the event, Model 1 provides non-significant findings for the health and education variables. This indicates that citizens do not draw on their evaluations of government performance in these two key policy areas when voting.

[Table 4]

Model 2 takes a binary dependent variable which identifies whether the respondent voted for Labour or for any other party. The model is specified as Model 1, with three additions: a dummy variable indicating knowledge of Labour being in government alone, and interaction terms between this knowledge variable on the one hand and policy assessments in health and education on the other. Our interest is in whether there is an interaction between being aware that Labour governed alone and evaluations of health and/or education. A statistically significant coefficient for this interaction would indicate that the best-informed citizens draw on performance evaluations when deciding how to vote; the converse finding would indicate that even the best-informed citizens do not vote retrospectively. In the event, Model 2 provides non-significant findings on the interaction terms. This indicates that knowledgeable voters in Wales do not draw on their evaluations of government performance in the two highly salient areas of health and education when voting at devolved elections.

The key finding that emerges from these models is that retrospective voting is not a discernible feature of electoral behaviour in Wales, at least not in relation to the two key devolved issues of health and education. Voters in Wales do not draw on their evaluations of

government performance in these two key policy areas when voting and therefore do not use their vote to sanction or reward those they believe are in government. The typical voter is just as likely to vote for a governing party whether or not they approve of the government's record on health and education. Even more knowledgeable voters, those who can identify that Labour governed alone, do not vote retrospectively. These voters, again, are just as likely to vote for or against Labour regardless of what they think about the government's performance in these two key policy areas.

## **7. Conclusion**

A key rationale for creating elected institutions at the devolved level in Wales in 1999 was to strengthen accountability. Yet claims that there remains an accountability deficit in Wales remain prevalent. This study has explored the state of electoral accountability at the devolved level in Wales. We structured the investigation to reflect the notion that to use elections as a sanctioning mechanism citizens must be able to assign responsibility accurately and must vote retrospectively. We examined whether citizens can identify the key competences of devolved policy-makers, what factors underpin their ability to do so, and whether voters draw on their evaluations of governmental performance when voting.

Our findings are as alarming as they are consistent. A surprisingly large proportion of citizens in Wales do not possess basic knowledge of devolved governance. A substantial minority are unable to identify key devolved policy areas, while the overwhelming majority cannot accurately identify the composition of the government.<sup>10</sup> Since few groups are identified as

---

<sup>10</sup> While this article is primarily interested in the current state of affairs, it is likely that findings relating to the 2016 election also apply in relation to previous elections. The key factors identified by the literature as undermining citizens' efforts to attribute responsibility are the complexity of the distribution of power both between levels of governance and between actors operating at the same level of governance, and the presence of a coalition



being less knowledgeable than others, it will take more to address these problems than simply targeting specific groups within the population. It is the least engaged politically that find the task of attributing responsibility most challenging, and this group may be the hardest to reach. Crucially, Welsh voters do not appear to draw on their evaluations of government performance when voting. Voters are just as willing to vote for a party they believe are in government regardless of whether they are satisfied with government performance. Even the more knowledgeable voters, those who can identify the partisan composition of the government, do not vote retrospectively. In short, there is an acute accountability deficit at the devolved level in Wales. It stems from a twin problem: many citizens do not have the information required to hold those in power to account, and many do not use their vote to sanction poor performance. Retrospective voting is not a discernible feature of electoral behaviour in Wales.

Beyond the study of electoral politics in Wales, this study provides significant insights for scholars working on issues relating to responsibility attributions and multi-level governance. Exploring new terrain, we have identified a sub-state setting in which citizens struggle to attribute responsibility accurately and in which attributions do not moderate the effect of policy evaluations on vote choice. Our finding that knowledge of the partisan composition of government is extremely limited in Wales serves as a reminder that scholars should not take for granted that citizens know which party or parties are in government, even in settings

---

government. Attributing responsibility has become marginally easier for Welsh voters over time: the transfer of primary legislative powers to Wales following the 2011 election clarified at which level of government power lies; the formal separation of power between the executive and legislative branches has made devolved politics easier to understand. The fact that the 2016 election (like the 2007 election) followed a period of single-party government should have made it easier than it was in 2003 and 2011 for citizens to identify the composition of government. If few voters could identify the competences and composition of Wales' devolved government in 2016, it is unlikely that more could do so previously.

featuring single-party governments (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). The study provides further evidence that consumption of relevant news media does not always facilitate understanding of governance (cf. Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Cutler, 2017). Further work is required to identify how the institutional context, the focus of the media, and the nature of elections shape the ability of citizens to attribute responsibility.

**Table 1: Policy responsibility attributions (Wave 2, pre-election)**

<i>Statistic</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>Wales</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Health</i>	15.1%	64.4%	2.4%	18.1%	2,277
<i>Education</i>	13.6%	58.6%	10.6%	17.2%	2,277
<i>Law and order</i>	47.4%	29.3%	4.5%	18.8%	2,277
<i>Foreign policy</i>	77.5%	1.9%	5.4%	15.2%	2,277
<i>Taxation</i>	78.1%	3.9%	2.8%	15.1%	2,277

**Table 2: Identifying parties in government**

Parties with ministers in government	
Conservatives	34.0%
Green Party	5.8%
Labour	60.8%
Liberal Democrats	24.3%
Plaid Cymru	41.4%
UKIP	4.1%
Don't know	28.8%
-	
Labour in government alone	16.0%
Labour in government, but in coalition	44.6%

Some form of coalition <sup>11</sup>	69.5%
N	2277

**Table 3: Modelling political knowledge**

	Model 1: Knowledge of division of competences	Model 2: Knowledge that Labour governed alone
	Poisson	Logistic
Age	-0.011 (0.024)	0.020 (0.118)
Age (sq)	0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.002)
Age (cubed)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00002)
Social class grouping: AB	0.055 (0.040)	0.145 (0.206)
Social class grouping: C1	-0.020 (0.037)	0.267 (0.190)
Social class grouping: C2	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.223)
Homeowner	0.041 (0.036)	-0.006 (0.183)
Higher education	0.021 (0.029)	0.410 <sup>***</sup> (0.149)
Married or partnered	-0.050 <sup>*</sup> (0.030)	-0.326 <sup>**</sup> (0.155)
Woman	-0.057 (0.064)	-1.010 <sup>***</sup> (0.347)

<sup>11</sup> Any type of coalition – regardless of whether Labour is included.

No children in household	0.099 <sup>**</sup> (0.049)	0.012 (0.229)
Born in Wales	0.017 (0.035)	-0.321 <sup>*</sup> (0.175)
Welsh language ability	0.016 (0.024)	0.046 (0.122)
More British than Welsh	0.003 (0.004)	-0.030 <sup>*</sup> (0.018)
Preferred constitutional status	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)
Greens (id)	0.065 (0.083)	-0.667 (0.477)
UKIP (id)	-0.020 (0.055)	-0.248 (0.285)
Plaid Cymru (id)	0.085 (0.056)	-0.271 (0.284)
LibDem (id)	0.132 <sup>**</sup> (0.064)	-0.112 (0.335)
Labour (id)	0.037 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.199)
Conservative (id)	0.079 <sup>*</sup> (0.043)	-0.184 (0.223)
Any Welsh media consumed	0.009 (0.029)	0.058 (0.150)
Interest in politics	0.082 <sup>***</sup> (0.018)	0.234 <sup>**</sup> (0.096)
Contacted by any party	0.025 (0.028)	0.296 <sup>**</sup> (0.142)
Likelihood of voting	0.026 <sup>***</sup> (0.006)	0.089 <sup>***</sup> (0.032)
Woman*No children in	-0.015 (0.070)	0.127 (0.379)

household		
Constant	0.966*** (0.373)	-1.791 (1.822)
Observations	1,781	1,781
Log Likelihood	-2,886.22	-616.858
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,826.45	1,287.72

**Table 4: Modelling political accountability**

	Model 1: Vote for party respondent thought was in government	Model 2: Voted Labour (incumbent)
Age	0.232 (0.166)	0.444** (0.207)
Age (sq)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)
Age (cubed)	0.00002 (0.00002)	0.00004 (0.00003)
Social class grouping: AB	-0.042 (0.294)	0.579 (0.371)
Social class grouping: C1	-0.079 (0.270)	-0.274 (0.344)
Social class grouping: C2	-0.024 (0.306)	-0.105 (0.393)
Homeowner	0.608** (0.268)	-0.567 (0.347)
Higher education	0.415** (0.209)	-0.026 (0.274)
Married or partnered	0.054 (0.231)	0.228 (0.295)
Woman	0.082 (0.202)	-0.177 (0.263)
No children in household	0.382 (0.281)	-0.113 (0.354)
Born in Wales	-0.046 (0.250)	-0.306 (0.336)
Welsh lang. ability	0.073 (0.171)	0.170 (0.223)
More British than Welsh	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.045 (0.034)
Preferred constitutional status	0.007* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)
Greens (id)	1.605 (1.033)	1.157 (0.889)

UKIP (id)	-2.000*** (0.630)	-2.530** (1.061)
Plaid Cymru (id)	0.345 (0.371)	-2.223*** (0.570)
LibDem (id)	0.312 (0.432)	-0.666 (0.538)
Labour (id)	1.300*** (0.306)	2.647*** (0.345)
Conservative (id)	0.340 (0.340)	-1.169** (0.463)
Any Welsh media consumed	0.249 (0.222)	-0.557* (0.29)
Interest in politics	0.059 (0.134)	0.136 (0.181)
Contacted by any party	0.050 (0.201)	-0.099 (0.262)
Likelihood of voting	0.242*** (0.074)	0.026 (0.103)
NHS: standard fallen	-0.223 (0.145)	0.029 (0.464)
Education: standard fallen	-0.076 (0.153)	-0.201 (0.454)
Knowledge of Labour in gov.		1.121 (1.198)
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * NHS: standard fallen		-0.400 (0.503)
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * Education: standard fallen		-0.145 (0.498)
Constant	-6.190** (2.719)	-7.271** (3.419)
Observations	754	754
Log Likelihood	-306.465	-205.995
Akaike Inf. Crit.	668.929	473.99
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

## References

- Anderson, C. D. (2006) 'Economic voting and multilevel governance: A comparative individual-level analysis', *American Journal of Political Science*, **50**(2), 449–463.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00194.x>
- Arceneaux, K. (2006) 'The federal face of voting: Are elected officials held accountable for the functions relevant to their office?', *Political Psychology*, **27**(5), 731–754.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00530.x>
- BBC News (2012) 'Assembly presiding officer warns about media “deficit”', Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-19904438>, accessed on 11 October 2017.
- Bradbury, J. and Mitchell, J. (2001) 'Devolution: New Politics for Old?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, **54**, 257–275. <https://doi.org/10.1093/parlij/54.2.257>
- Bradbury, J., Denver, D., Mitchell, J. and Bennie, L. (2000) 'Devolution and party change: Candidate selection for the 1999 Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly elections', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, **6**(3), pp. 51–72.  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330008420631>
- Chaney, P. (2016) 'How does single party dominance influence civil society organisations' engagement strategies? Exploratory analysis of participative mainstreaming in a 'regional' European polity', *Public Policy and Administration*, **31**(2), pp. 122–146.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076715581876>
- Chaney, P., Hall, T., and Pithouse, A. (2001) 'New Governance – New Democracy?' In: Chaney, P., Hall, T., and Pithouse, A. (eds.) *New Governance – New Democracy?*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press pp. 1–17.
- Cushion, S. and Scully, R., (2016) 'British media is failing to give voters the full picture ahead of elections', *The Conversation*. Available at: <http://theconversation.com/british->



[media-is-failing-to-give-voters-the-full-picture-ahead-of-elections-57020](#), accessed on 25 October 2017.

Cutler, F. (2004), 'Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in Federations', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, **34**(2), 19–38.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a005028>

Cutler, F. (2017) 'Political Conditions for Electoral Accountability in Federalism', *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, 50(4), 1037–59.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423917000282>

Fiorina, M., (1981) *Retrospective voting in American national elections*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Fisher, S. D., and Hobolt, S. B. (2010) 'Coalition government and electoral accountability', *Electoral Studies*, 29(3), 358–369. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.003>

Fortunato, D., and Stevenson, R. T. (2013) 'Performance voting and knowledge of cabinet composition', *Electoral Studies*, **32**(3), 517–523.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.001>

Garry, J. (2014) 'Holding parties responsible at election time: Multi-level, multi-party government and electoral accountability', *Electoral Studies*, **34**, 78–88.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.12.003>

Gomez, B. T., and Wilson, J. M. (2008) 'Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, **38**(4), 633–650.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjn016>

HC Deb 22 July 1997 Vol. 298 Col. 757.

Hobolt, S.B. and Tilley, J., (2014) *Blaming Europe? Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Johns, R. (2011) 'Credit Where it's Due? Valence Politics, Attributions of Responsibility, and Multi-Level Elections', *Political Behaviour*, 33(1), 55–77.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9116-y>

Lau, R. R., and Redlawsk, D. P. (2001) 'Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making', *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(4), 951. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334>

León, S. (2012) 'How do citizens attribute responsibility in multilevel states? Learning, biases and asymmetric federalism. Evidence from Spain', *Electoral Studies*, 31(1), 120–30. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.09.003>

Maestas, C. D., Atkeson, L. R., Croom, T., and Bryant, L. A. (2008) 'Shifting the Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following Hurricane Katrina', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 38(4), 609–632.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjn021>

Marsh, M., and Tilley, J. (2010) 'The attribution of credit and blame to governments and its impact on vote choice', *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(1), 115–134.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123409990275>

McAllister, L. (2000) 'The New Politics in Wales: Rhetoric or Reality?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, pp. 591–604. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/53.3.591>

- McAllister, L., and Cole, M. (2007) 'Pioneering New Politics or Rearranging the Deckchairs? The 2007 National Assembly for Wales Election and Results', *The Political Quarterly*, **78**(4), pp. 536–546. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2007.00882.x>
- McAllister, L., and Cole, M. (2014) 'The 2011 Welsh General Election: An Analysis of the Latest Staging Post in the Maturing of Welsh Politics', *Parliamentary Affairs*, **67**, pp. 172–190. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gss036>
- McAllister, L., and Kay, A. (2010) 'Core tensions in Wales's new politics: pluralist trends in a majoritarian system', *Public Money & Management*, **30**(2), pp. 103–108. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09540961003665529>
- Papadopoulos, Y. (2007) 'Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multi-Level Governance', *European Law Journal*, **13**(4), 469–486. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00379.x>
- Powell, G. B., and Whitten, G. D. (1993) 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context', *American Journal of Political Science*, **37**(2), 391–414. DOI: 10.2307/2111378
- Rudolph, T. J. (2006) 'Triangulating political responsibility: The motivated formation of responsibility judgments', *Political Psychology*, **27**(1), 99–122. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00461.x>
- Scully, R. (2016) 'What matters to us', *Elections in Wales Blog*, available: <http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/2016/02/22/what-matters-to-us/>, accessed on 7 May 2018.

- Scully, R., and Larnar, J. (2017) 'A Successful Defence: the 2016 National Assembly for Wales Election', *Parliamentary Affairs*, **70**(3), 507–29.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsw033>
- Scully, R., and Wyn Jones, R. (2015) 'The Public Legitimacy of the National Assembly for Wales', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, **21**(4), pp. 515–533.  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2015.1059591>
- Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., and Tetlock, P. E. (1991) *Reasoning and choice: explorations in political psychology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Stirbu, D., Larnar, J., and McAllister, L. (2018) 'Gender Representation in Wales: New Approaches to Candidate Selection in UK's Devolved Legislatures and Beyond' In: Cordero, G., Collier X. (eds.) *Democratizing Candidate Selection: New Methods, Old Receipts?*, Cham, Palgrave MacMillan pp. 201–230.
- The Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform (2017) *A Parliament that works for Wales: The Report of the Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform*, Cardiff, National Assembly for Wales.
- Taylor, B., Curtice, J., and Thomson, K. (1999) 'Introductions and Conclusions' In: Taylor, B., and Thomson, K. (eds.) *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press pp. xxiiiv–xlii.
- Thomas, J., Cushion, S. and Jewell, J., 2004 'Stirring up apathy? Political disengagement and the media in the 2003 Welsh Assembly elections', *Journal of Public Affairs*, **4**(4), pp.355–363. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.198>

UK's Changing Union (undated) *Size Matters: Making the National Assembly more effective*, Cardiff.

Welsh Government (2017) 'Final Budget 2017–18', available:

<http://gov.wales/funding/budget/final-budget-2017-18/?lang=en> accessed on 18 December 2017.

Williams, C. (ed.) (2011) *Social Policy for Social Welfare Practice in a Devolved Wales (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.)*, Birmingham, Venture Press.

Wyn Jones, R. (2016) 'Professor Richard Wyn Jones' excoriating verdict on the Wales Bill plans for devolution', accessed at <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/richard-wyn-jones-wales-bill-12091891> on 26 July 2018.

Wyn Jones, R., and Scully, R. (2012) *Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press.

Wyn Jones, R., and Trystan, D. (2001) 'Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy in the Politics of Post-devolution Wales' In: Chaney, P., Hall, T., Pithouse, A. (eds.) *New Governance – New Democracy?*, Cardiff, University of Wales Press pp. 18–47.